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FOREWORD 
Why Marc Galanter's "Haves" Article is One of the Most 
Influential Pieces of Legal Scholarship Ever Written 
Shauhin A. Talesh 
A few of the adjectives that I use when describing Marc Galanter's article pub-
lished in 1974, entitled Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the 
Limits of Legal Change, include seminal, blockbuster, canonical, game-changing, 
extraordinary, pivotal, and noteworthy. But do not take my word for it. Consider 
for a moment the article's place in the history of legal scholarship. In 1996, an 
empirical study of the most-cited law review articles of all time revealed that 
Galanter's article placed thirteenth (Shapiro 1996).1 The Social Science Citation 
Index has named the article "a citation classic." Galanter's article was included 
in the 2006 volume entitled "The Canon of American Legal Thought" (Kennedy 
& Fisher 2006). Notably, the introduction to that volume considered the article's 
place in the development of American legal thought in the 20th century. For the 
article's 25th anniversary, the Law & Society Review published a symposium 
volume of articles dedicated to highlighting extensions and elaborations of the 
original article. In addition to being cited by numerous courts in the United 
States, Galanter's article has been translated into Italian, Dutch, Spanish, Chinese, 
French, and Portuguese, among other languages. 
Aside from the. article's impact on scholarly and policy discourse, the ar-
ticle impacts the training and education of students interested in studying law. 
Galanter's article is assigned in virtually every law and society or sociology of law 
undergraduate and graduate course in the United States. The article is cited in 
dozens of Civil Procedure casebooks that law professors use to teach first year 
law students. As we reach the forty year anniversary of this article's publication, 
I reach one uncontroverted conclusion: this article is one of the most influential 
pieces of legal scholarship ever written. 
In Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead, Marc Galanter explained how "repeat 
players," i.e., those persons and organizations that anticipate having repeat litiga-
tion and have resources to pursue long-term interests, shape the development of 
law and engage in a litigation game quite differently than do "one-shotters," i.e., 
those persons and organizations that deal with the legal system infrequently. Mov-
ing beyond legal formalism, Galanter's article provides a typology that highlights 
the various litigation configurations among one-shotters and repeat players: one-
' An updated version of this study revealed it is currently the 37th most-cited law review article 
(Shapiro & Pearse 2012). Over the years, it has often been regarded as one of the most-cited law 
review articles not involving constitutional law. 
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shatters versus repeat players, repeat players versus one-shatters, one-shatters 
versus one-shatters, and repeat players versus repeat players. 
Galanter noted that repeat players (often large bureaucratic organizations) 
have long-term strategic interests beyond the immediate monetary stakes of an 
individual dispute. Specifically, repeat players play the odds in their repetitive 
interactions and engagements by settling cases that are likely to produce adverse 
precedent and litigating cases that are likely to produce rules that promote their 
interests. Factors that influence.party decisions whether to litigate or settle include 
assessments of the likelihood of success, the resources available, and the costs of 
continuing litigation. By filtering cases in which courts develop law, repeat play-
ers secure legal interpretations that favor their interests and impede the ability 
for one-shatters to achieve significant social reforms through the legal system. 
Galanter's framework is significant because it highlights how unequal resources 
and incentives of parties may allow repeat players to control and determine the 
content of law. As a result, repeat players are able to influence the content and 
meaning of law. 
By analyzing situations in which repeat players gain advantages in the legal 
system, Galanter set out an important agenda for legal scholars, sociologists, po-
litical scientists, and economists interested in examining (1) the law's capacity to 
produce social change, (2) the limits of the legal system to achieve redistributive 
outcomes, (3) the advantages and disadvantages of alternative and conventional 
legal procedures, (4) law and inequality, and (5) the gap between the law on the 
books and the law in action. Scholars have been exploring these and other ques-
tions for the past forty years in a variety of areas (Glenn 2003; Kritzer & Silbey 
2003; Talesh 2013). Let me briefly highlight the multifaceted directions several 
generations of scholars and legal actors have taken the article. 
Scholars empirically study and analyze the one-shatter v. repeat player frame-
work in relation to courts. In particular, the various structural advantages repeat 
players enjoy in the legal system that Galanter emphasizes-namely, greater access 
to resources, information, specialists, reduced start-up costs, long-run strategic 
interests, and development of informal facilitative relationships with institutional 
incumbents-provide a valuable set of variables to explore. Empirical studies dem-
onstrate that repeat· player litigants with substantial organizational resources and 
strength are much more likely to win in the federal courts of appeals than one-shot 
litigants that have fewer resources (Songer et al. 1999). Another empirical study 
demonstrates that litigation resources are much more strongly related to success 
in the courts of appeals than in either the United State Supreme Court or state 
supreme courts (Songer & Sheehan 1992). With regard to state supreme courts, 
stronger parties, especially larger governmental units, achieve an advantage over 
weaker parties, though the advantage generally is rather small (Wheeler et al. 
1987). 
Research generated from Galanter's article is not limited to the United States, 
but shapes how scholars examine courts in other countries. For example, Szmer 
and colleagues examined the impact of lawyer capability on the decision making 
of the Supreme Court of Canada and found that litigation experience and litiga-
tion team size influenced Canadian court decision making (Szmer et al. 2007). 
A comparative analysis of 14,000 civil cases in the United States and United 
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Kingdom across a variety of disputing forums reveals that one important effect 
of lawyer representation is increased formality, which sometimes works to disad-
vantage people who attempt to represent themselves (Sandefur 2005). Studies of 
the Philippine Supreme Court (Haynie 1994, 1995; Haynie et al. 2001), the High 
Court of Australia (Willis & Sheehan 1999; Smyth 2000), the Court of Appeal of 
England and Wales (Atkins 1991), the Indian Supreme Court (Haynie et al. 2001), 
the South African Supreme Court (Haynie et al. 2001), and the Tanzanian Court 
·of Appeals (Haynie et al. 2001) all examine outcomes under the "party capability 
theory" that Galanter set forth years ago. These studies provide general support 
for the proposition that in the context of appellate litigation, the "Haves" come out 
ahead against weaker parties because they have tangible and intangible resource 
advantages. 
Party resource advantages, however, need not lie only with private actors. 
Other research demonstrates how that advantage lies even more with govern-
ments than business parties (Kritzer 2003). Kritzer's study highlights how the 
government does not merely have greater resources and experience, but has 
a fundamental advantage since it sets the rules by which cases are brought and 
decisions are made. Moreover, it is government officials such as judges who make 
the decisions. Other empirical studies focus on the pivotal role that lawyers play 
among Haves and Have-nots. A randomized experimental evaluation of a legal 
assistance program for low-income tenants shows that the provision of legal 
counsel produces large differences in outcomes for low-income tenants in housing 
court, independent of the merits of the case (Seron et al. 2001). Quite apart from 
examining the state of and resource capacity of different litigants, one study dem-
onstrates that lawyers can be viewed as repeat players who affect judicial outcomes 
(McGuire 1995). While Galanter's article and its progeny mapped the dilemmas 
of judicially created common law rules, others have expanded the analysis to 
social reform legislation designed to address a specific social problem or protect 
disadvantaged interests (Albiston 1999). Thus, aside from traditional theories of 
lobbying, campaign contributions and agency capture, ongoing research using 
Galanter's typology over the past forty years reveals how repeat players are able to 
influence judicial decisions and social reform legislation. 
Scholars also adopt Galanter's framework, however, when studying "court-
appended systems," Galanter's term for referring to state and federal court-
connected alternative dispute resolution (ADR) programs and private voluntary 
or mandatory ADR programs (see Talesh 2013 for summary). Amidst the chal-
lenges of using the formal court system to resolve conflicts, internal grievance and 
alternative dispute resolution are increasingly the forums for resolving potential 
legal disputes (Galanter & Lande 1992; Sutton et al. 1994; Edelman & Suchman 
1999; Menkel-Meadow 1999). The increasing privatization of dispute resolution 
by organizations is supported and approved by legislatures (Talesh 2009, 2013, 
2015) and courts across the United States (Edelman & Talesh 2011). Empirical 
studies in these forums that specifically use Galanter's framework focus on varia-
tion in complainants' success rates (Hanningan 1977; Bingham 1998; Bingham 
and Sarraf 2000; Eisenberg & Hill 2003; Hirsh 2008; Colvin 2011), the influence 
of occupational prestige and experience (Kinsey & Stalans 1999; Hirsh 2008), law-
yer representation (Bingham 1997), legal resources (Steele 1974; Burstein 1989; 
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Bingham 1997; Hirsh 2008) and complaint handlers' decision making (Edelman, 
Erlanger & Lande 1993; Gilad 2010). 
In addition to analyzing these mechanisms, scholars debate whether outcomes 
are better for one-shatters or repeat players in alternative forums. Moreover, 
policy debates concerning reforming alternative dispute resolution structures are 
often framed using Galanter's framework (Stone 1996; Menkel-Meadow 1999; 
Cole 2001; Talesh 2012, 2013). In sum, in addition to using Galanter's framework 
when evaluating party interaction with public legal institutions, scholars use his 
framework when examining private disputing forums. 
But what about in the 21st century? How has the relationship between one-
shotters and repeat players changed, if at all, amidst the move toward public-
private partnerships and the contracting out of rights to private and quasi-private 
adjudicatory regimes? Surprisingly, although it is well-established that consumers 
and other aggrieved parties such as employees and shareholders are adjudicating 
public legal rights through internal grievance and alternative dispute resolution 
forums operated by private actors with the blessing of courts and legislatures, 
little empirical research addresses how these disputing forums are created, how do 
they operate, and in particular, what is the process through which the meaning of 
law is constructed through different organizational dispute resolution structures. 
Galanter on occasion has urged for more research on these very issues (Galanter 
& Lande 1992). 
My own work attempts to synthesize these two strands of research that spawned 
from Galanter's seminal article concerning repeat player influence among public 
and private legal institutions. Rather than examining repeat player influence over 
public legal institutions and private dispute resolution structures separately, my 
research for the past decade tries to articulate a framework for understanding how 
the Haves come out ahead in the 21st century. As the boundaries between public 
and private become increasingly blurred, my empirical research suggests that the 
Haves create a private legal order, then influence the public legal order, in order to 
utilize and maintain a private legal order (Talesh 2009, 2012, 2013). 
In response to powerful consumer protection laws aimed at manufacturers 
standing behind their warranties issued to consumers, my research shows how 
automobile manufacturers first created internal dispute resolution structures to 
adjudicate public legal rights outside the judicial process and then ceded control 
of these structures to third-party dispute resolution organizations for legitimacy 
purposes (Talesh 2009, 2013). The legislature ultimately codified these privatized 
adjudicatory systems into law and afforded considerable deference to these quasi-
private and quasi-public regimes. Thus, I demonstrate a connection between the 
Haves creating a private disputing regime and influencing public legal institutions 
such as courts and legislatures. By analyzing how the quintessential repeat play-
er-organizations-legalize their disputes themselves while also interacting with 
legislatures and courts, I offer a unique view into the processes and mechanisms 
through which law codified in public legal institutions is flowing from law that 
is created among and within organizations. Understanding how organizational 
repeat player influence converges in both spaces simultaneously is particularly 
important given the tum toward public-private partnerships in society. 
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Through participant observation and interviews, I continued my analysis by 
comparing how two different alternative dispute resolution forums (one created 
and administered by private organizations in California, and the other adminis-
tered and run by the state of Vermont) operating outside the court system resolve 
consumer disputes. Unlike the single-arbitrator system in the private dispute reso-
lution programs, Vermont uses an arbitration board consisting of a five-person 
panel of arbitrators (three citizens, an automotive dealer representative, and a 
technical expert). I find that the institutional design of dispute resolution, and how 
business and consumer values and perspectives are translated by field actors in 
different dispute resolution systems, leads to two different meanings of law op-
erating in California and Vermont. Managerial and business values of rationality, 
efficiency, and discretion flow into law operating in California's private dispute 
resolution structures primarily through an arbitration training and socialization 
process conducted by third-party administrators hired by automobile manufactur-
ers to run their lemon law arbitration program (Talesh 2012). The institutional 
context socializes arbitrators to ignore consumer emotion and narrows the fact-
finding role of arbitrators to a passive arbiter reliant on parties to present facts. As 
a result, arbitrators are taught to adjudicate cases not in the shadow of the formal 
lemon law on the books, but in the shadow of a managerialized lemon law replete 
with its own rules, procedures, and construction of law that changes the meaning 
of consumer protection. Moreover, as business values flow through the disputing 
structure, organizational repeat players gain subtle opportunities for advantages 
through the operation of California dispute resolution structures. 
Vermont's vastly different dispute resolution system has far less tendency than 
the process in California to introduce busirtess values into the meaning and opera-
tion of lemon laws. To the extent business values are introduced into the process 
by the presence of dealer and technical expert board members, they are balanced 
with competing consumer logics by the presence of citizen panel members and a 
state administrator. Rather than emphasizing professional training and socializa-
tion, Vermont's structure illustrates how participatory representation, an inquisi-
torial fact-finding approach, and balancing consumer and business perspectives 
in the decision-making process can help curb repeat player advantages. In terms 
of consumer outcomes in these hearings, consumers do far worse in private than 
state-run disputing structures (Talesh 2012). 
Thus, my own work builds upon and elaborates Galanter's work and offers 
an updated account of the relationship between repeat players and one-shotters 
in the 21st century. In a world where private actors are increasingly involved in 
handling functions traditionally run by the government, the Haves no longer 
simply play for favorable rules in the public arena, but rather play for removing 
the entire disputing game from the public arena into the private arena, actively 
create the terms of legal compliance, and reshape the meaning of consumer rights 
and remedies. This is a critical and as yet unrecognized way in which the Haves 
come out ahead. However, contrary to most studies that demonstrate how repeat 
players gain advantages in disputing structures, my comparative research design 
also allows me to explore how dispute resolution structures can also inhibit repeat 
player advantages. Simply stated, the institutional design can facilitate and inhibit 
repeat player advantages. 
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Galanter's article did not just provide us with a typology and vocabulary 
that has become part of the lexicon of law, it set forth a wide-reaching research 
agenda that has shaped the thinking of scholars and policymakers. More research 
is needed to explore how different dispute resolution systems with varying degrees 
of business and state involvement operate on the ground and interpret and imple-
ment law. If studies building upon Galanter's work have shown us anything, it 
is that there is great variation in when, whether, and how the Haves come out 
ahead. While much work has been done, scholars should continue to learn more 
about what is happening on the ground when Haves and Have-nots interact in 
legal settings. 
In addition to spurring several decades of exciting and important research, 
Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead has achieved canonical stature within college 
and university courses. I had the pleasure of being assigned the article as part of my 
undergraduate coursework, in law school, and during my doctoral studies. Having 
moved into academia, I now assign the article to my first-year law students every 
year when I teach Procedural Analysis. 2 Why? In most procedure courses, students 
learn the language, structure, and interpretation of the complex rules governing 
the operation of the American federal civil justice system. Students analyze cases 
and problems concerning when, where, and whether to bring a lawsuit, against 
whom to bring the action, and what procedural options are available to respond 
strategically to the changing circumstances as the lawsuit proceeds. At its core, 
the course is concerned with the lawyer's vast array of procedural options and 
maneuvers in bringing or defending a lawsuit. Certain themes generally prevail 
throughout a procedure course, including how should procedural systems balance 
justice and efficiency, what does procedural fairness mean in different contexts, 
and how does procedural fairness impact substantive fairness. 
I assign Galanter's article because it succinctly conveys what procedure pro-
fessors have emphasized to students for decades: procedure is not merely about 
"the rules," but rather how the rules are used and mobilized by the players in the 
litigation game. To the extent procedure affects and at times even trumps substan-
tive fairness, Galanter's article provides a wonderful lens into how this occurs. 
Galanter does this by explaining how the actors who use the litigation system vary 
in resources and power. While procedure professors take a semester to unpack 
the distinction between procedure and substance, Galanter unpacks this issue in a 
few pages by highlighting the advantages that repeat players maintain in the civil 
litigation system. These repeat player advantages include but are not limited to (1) 
advanced intelligence and the ability to preplan transactions, (2) ongoing access to 
specialists and lawyers, reduced start-up costs and economies of scale, (3) informal 
facilitative relationships with institutional actors, (4) long-run strategic interests 
and the ability to play for favorable rules, and (5) experience in discerning which 
rule-changes are likely to "penetrate" into the law in action. 
While Galanter's focus is on the configuration of power and the systematic 
structural advantages and disadvantages in litigation, the article does not offer a 
class or power elite analysis. He does not conclude that members of the dominant 
class or large wealthy organizations always win in litigation. Rather, he focuses 
2 UC Irvine's version of Civil Procedure is called Procedural Analysis. 
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on the way that the litigation system-and the procedural rules within it-create 
structural advantages for repeat players. In sum, I believe every law and legal 
studies student should be required to read his article because it contextualizes the 
procedural system as something more than a set of rules that should be memorized 
and mechanically applied. Galanter's gift is that his article reflects a sophisticated 
set of ideas, yet he still manages to convey the ideas in simple ways. Consequently, 
students benefit from reading this article because it illuminates how efficiency, 
justice, equality, and procedural and substantive fairness impact litigants in real 
and tangible ways. The article captures the real and lived experience of those who 
encounter law in society, and provides context for talking about rules that are too 
often thought of as "given" to society by formal legal institutions. 
As we celebrate the 4oth anniversary of this article, I do not think anyone-
scholars, students, policymakers, judges, or individual citizens-can credibly dis-
pute that this article continues to impact those who interact with the law. I hope 
that those interested in understanding the social and political dynamics of the law 
and law's capacity to produce social change will continue to draw from one of the 
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